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ABSTRACT
This paper questions current efforts to bring about good governance in devel-
oping countries. While the good governance agenda has mostly been targeted at na-
tional governments, it is argued that good governance efforts should be aimed at the
local, municipal level, where the poor, excluded and oppressed live, and where - ideally
- proper policies are implemented and national legislation is enforced. However, the
key institution here - local government - is often very weak in terms of capacity, fi-
nance, and self-interested interference by the rich, the powerful and politicians. Inter-
ventions by central governments and donors will not suffice to bring about the changes
required. One way out could be organised pressure and participation from below in
what is termed participatory governance - including partnerships between local gov-
ernment, NGOs, and formal as well as informal (endogenous) community organisa-
tions. Examples of such governance are presented, as well as practical suggestions for
donors and other organisations relating to improved governance.3
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Since the early nineties all major donor agencies have started to insist that 'good
governance' is important for developing countries to achieve real development and to
reduce poverty. By now, perhaps surprisingly, there is fairly common agreement
amongst donors on the nature of good governance, including, among other things de-
mocracy, the rule of law, human rights, combating corruption. Indeed, the agenda has
become so broad and all inclusive that it cannot be expected to be operationalised fully.
Some donors have just increased attention for certain good governance issues, and have
devised new criteria and instruments. A country like the Netherlands goes much fur-
ther, by limiting its aid to poor countries perceived to have good policy and good gov-
ernance, and by offering a good governance aid package to others. 
Now that donors have committed themselves publicly to promoting good gov-
ernance, a critical question is how exactly they will set about to do this in practice. One
can wonder whether donors realise that, in order to be effective, they need to become
deeper involved in developing countries than before, that they are embarking on a po-
litically sensitive road. So far, many interventions aimed to enhance good governance
have been somewhat loosely aimed at the national level of developing countries. 
There is less attention for and clarity about concretely promoting good govern-
ance in relation to enhancing the quality of policy implementation, particularly poverty
reduction strategies. Related to this, there is a neglect of the local level: few donors
concentrate as yet on the performance and limitations of local governments. Donor
agencies talk much about a role for civil society at this local level, and the importance
of participatory approaches, but there is not much clarity how to set about this in a
meaningful way. And even while empowerment is a much talked about theme, only
few donors, and relatively few NGOs deal with this in practice, often in a fragmented,
project-type way.
This paper argues that it is urgent for donors to give more attention to promot-
ing good governance at the local government level. It is in the villages and slums that
the poor, excluded and oppressed live, and it is here that their problems need to be ad-
dressed, that national funds are to be applied and laws implemented. The institution to
do all this is local government. However, in many developing countries, it faces urgent
problems of capacity and finance, resulting in (very) poor governance. The key ques-
tion to be addressed in this paper is then what donors can and should do to promote
better or good governance at this local level in general, and as regards poverty reduc2
tion in specific. And related to this: how can the poor bring their agendas to bear on the
local government, in contrast to how other groups already manage to do this, how can
their decision making powers be increased?
More institutional development, or isolated attempts to combat corruption will
clearly not be enough to reform local governments. They cannot be trusted to do this
alone: those governments in need of the most comprehensive reforms have the weakest
capacity to manage these. The most critical and potentially most sustainable contribu-
tion to bring about better governance at the local level should come from civil society,
more precisely from local grassroots organisations, and, where possible, from the (far
fewer) local NGOs. What is needed is identifying and creating conditions for what has
been termed 'participatory governance', establishing frameworks and implementing ap-
proaches where local government, grassroots institutions and NGOs jointly work to-
wards good governance in partnership. 
Participatory governance deviates from and adds to the current community par-
ticipation approaches which are seen as too limited in scope and as too fragmented.
This paper explores the prospects for such a more ambitious form of participation, both
in terms of involving a broader range of often neglected 'informal' or indigenous initia-
tives and organisations, and of linking these more structurally to local government
through appropriate institutional linkages. It also examines the prospects and modalities
for the poor to make their voices heard at supra-local, regional and state levels, where
often the most important decisions are being taken. 
This paper is exploratory in nature, probing the opportunities and the complexi-
ties of a new situation where donor agencies' stated goal is good governance, but where
the required vision and the tools are as yet underdeveloped. It wants to contribute to
discussions on the way forward, and does not expect to provide the answers. Indeed,
many of the issues raised here, sometimes in a cursory way, need further scrutiny; in a
way this paper represents a good governance research agenda. The paper is set up in the
following way.
In the first section, the international changes are described that triggered atten-
tion for good governance issues, and how this was defined in the good governance
agenda. Specific attention is given to the case of the Netherlands. In a second section I
briefly consider the instruments and approaches applied to date to bring about better
governance. It is concluded that they are not sufficient, and that, especially at the local
level, other approaches are needed, which involve civil society in participatory govern3
ance. At this local level, I briefly look at the nature of local governance, noting the of-
ten severe financial and capacity problems. Conditions at this local level from the point
of view of the poor are subsequently depicted, starting with informal and 'indigenous'
grassroots institutions and moving on to the access problems of the poor. 
The focus in the following section three is on the limitations of current commu-
nity participation efforts with a view to bringing about participatory governance. In re-
lation to this, the role of non-governmental organisations is also considered. It appears
that they are presently not sufficiently geared towards effecting empowerment, and to-
wards co-operating with or forging partnerships with local government. With a view to
assess the prospects and problems of participatory governance, promising or effective
partnership approaches are examined and compared in section four.  It is recognised
that bringing about such partnerships is laborious and even risky, and for that reason
the potential is examined of social movements as another, more radical way to effect a
change in governance. Section five contains suggestions for donor agencies to enhance
good governance at the local level. These relate to the poor and their organisations, to
NGOs and to local (and central) government. Some concluding remarks are made in the
final section six. I reflect on the implications of the efforts to implement the good gov-
ernance agenda, the prospects for participatory governance, and on the role that donors
can and should play to make the latter possible.
1. CHANGING DONOR PERCEPTIONS AND STRATEGIES: THE NEED 
FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE
1.1 Changing donor views
Since the 1980s, donor agencies started to increasingly pay attention to the
quality of governance, which can be partly explained by the problems of the former
communist transition states in Central and East Europe, and the near bankruptcy of
many states in Sub Saharan Africa. More than ever before, donor agencies appeared
willing to publicly admit that 'poor governance', economic mismanagement, and cor-
ruption undermined the development potential of many countries (OECD, 1995). Some
such problems can be defined in terms of a lack of capacity - a lack of funds or inade-
quate human resources - other problems can be defined rather better in terms of out-
right mismanagement, nepotism and corruption. In a generic sense this is brought out
well in the following statement from a remarkably frank report by the African Gover4
nors of the World Bank to the World Bank President (World Bank, 1996):
Poor governance is now generally recognised as the root of Africa's capacity
problems...(….)...In most countries, narrow political considerations have
taken precedence over the public interest and broader issues of development,
power is personalized rather than imbedded in rules and institutions,
patronage and corruption pervade administrative and political culture, and
there is no accountability and transparency in the public sector. Amidst all
these, the role of the state has been extended well beyond its technical and
managerial capacities. The failure of Governance has created an environment
that is antithetical to the development of capacity in both the public and
private sectors and in civil society.
This situation which perhaps applies even more at the local than at the central
level leads to the absence of characteristics which are now defined as components of
good governance such as  accountability and efficiency. The discussion on poor gov-
ernance received new impetus, and obtained a sharper edge, with the influential report
'Assessing Aid' (World Bank, 1998). The report established a clear link between 'Good
governance' and the effectiveness of Aid:
'Financial aid works in a good policy environment. Financial assistance leads
to faster growth, poverty reduction and gains in social indicators in
developing countries with a sound economic management. In a weak
environment, however, money has much less impact' (ibid.).
The report also notes that an active civil society contributes to an improved
public service. Indeed, good governance includes an attempt to make the bureaucracy
more accountable, transparent and responsive, not through the bureaucracy changing
itself on its own accord, but through externally organized demand: civil society builds
the capacity and skills to press government to be accountable (Hirschmann, 1999: 301).
The report goes on to argue that aid can play an important role in supporting 'champi-
ons of reform' or change agents. 
The definition of good governance used in this paper is taken from the Nether-
lands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (de Wit, 1998: 4):
The transparent and responsible application by the state of its political
authority and power to effect social development, in dialogue with the
population and by effectively utilizing available resources. 
Donor agencies seem, by and large, to agree on the following the characteristics
of good governance: democracy (especially multi-party democracy), respect for and
enforcement of human rights and the rule of law, efficiency, accountability and trans-
parency in governance and public administration, parliamentary control, open and free
media, equity, and modest levels of military spending. Besides, good governance is as-
sociated with popular participation and a strong and active civil society. Some donor
agencies emphasise a concern for poverty alleviation and a commitment to market ori5
ented economic policies (OECD, 1995; de Wit, 1998). good governance is both a
means to bring about development for example poverty reduction, and a development
objective in itself. 
1.2 Netherlands development aid and good governance
The Netherlands is taking the good governance agenda very seriously. In vari-
ous letters to Parliament (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998, 1999), the
Minister for Development Cooperation explains her determination to reduce the num-
ber of countries with which a development cooperation relation is maintained. She ar-
gues that, from a practical point of view, the number of countries receiving Dutch aid
had become too large to be able to safeguard the quality of aid provision. But equally
important is that the minister is strongly influenced by the aforementioned World Bank
report 'Assessing Aid' and that she agrees with the view that aid is especially effective
in countries which are marked by good governance. 
The ministry has defined the chief criteria for countries with which the Nether-
lands can entertain a structural, bilateral relationship: the extent of poverty, the quality
of socio-economic policy and the quality of governance. Apart from this, the Ministry
also considers the aid requirements of a country, the scope for access to money mar-
kets, the nature and quality of the present aid-programme and the role a country plays
in relation to peace and security in a region (ibid.). After having applied these criteria,
the Netherlands Government recently decided to reduce the number of countries for
long term aid to 17 'focus' countries. For historical and political reasons, the Nether-
lands will still entertain an temporary aid relationship with three other countries for five
years, bringing the total number of countries to 17 + 3. 
Apart from these 17 + 3 core countries, The Netherlands will have specific,
limited aid relationships with some other countries on a thematic basis: regarding the
environment, economic aid to be channelled though Dutch firms, and regarding 'activi-
ties in the field of human rights, promoting peace and good governance'. The latter pro-
gramme will be implemented in countries where the prospects for cooperation in this
field are good; this includes the regular 17 + 3 core countries, and in addition fifteen
others. Support in this field is also possible in all other developing countries, but will
not be aimed at Governments but at non-governmental organisations.  6
1.3 Other changes in Dutch aid policy
Three other developments may be mentioned with respect to Dutch aid. First,
the minister wants to increase the 'ownership' of aid by recipient countries. Given that a
country has (an acceptable degree of) good governance, the Netherlands will attach less
conditions to aid. Nevertheless, 'blank cheques' will not be given; there will remain a
few points of attention in the aid relationship. There must be agreement on the absolute
need to reduce poverty; recipient country budgets must be transparent; there must be
decentralisation which forms a guarantee that the aid does reach the poor and the mar-
ginal areas of the country; regular monitoring will take place and aid will be coordi-
nated with other donors. 
A second policy development is not as yet clearly defined, but is potentially im-
portant for this paper's discussion on the scope for participatory governance. The min-
ister intends to change the relationship between official Netherlands bilateral aid and
the activities of the Netherlands' Co-Financing Agencies such as NOVIB and ICCO,
indicating that there should be closer cooperation between or 'complementarity' of the
two aid channels in the field of policy. Local Southern NGOs should become 'involved
in the various policy stages from planning to implementation and evaluation' (Nether-
lands Ministry of Foreign. Affairs, 1999; Oonk, 1999: 30). 
1.4 Sectoral approaches
Finally, and related to the wish to increase local ownership of the aid pro-
gramme, the minister wants to gradually provide most bilateral aid through 'sectoral
approaches' (see below), and, related to this, to also reduce the number of sectors to
which aid will be given, again to enhance the quality of aid by concentrating the efforts.
Here, the Netherlands Ministry for Development Cooperation again follows main-
stream donor thinking and policy, by joining many donor agencies which have already
started to disburse much of their aid through various types of sectoral programmes
(Fells and Jacobs, 1999).
Key aspects of the sectoral approach are: i) programmes are financed through
the 'normal' budget of the recipient government; ii) it is based on integrated sectoral
strategies; iii) sectoral programmes are the basis for an aid package of various donors,
providing a management framework for common donor implementation procedures
(Fell and Jacobs, 1999: 43). Teskey (1996: 4) discusses Sector Investment Programmes
and adds to this that these will be based on a clearly articulated and "owned" sector7
policy framework, and that host governments and other local stakeholders will be fully
in charge. Sectoral investment or development programmes are steadily gaining im-
portance, partly as a reaction to problems experienced with the formerly most important
project approach.
A listing of all negative traits reads like this: project approaches have reduced
local ownership, and were often donor driven; if successful, they remained 'islands of
excellence'; following fixed time paths and funding patterns they were inflexible (blue-
prints) and unable to adjust (in contrast to a more flexible process approach); they were
often donor supported with little local contribution and hence unsustainable, a problem
compounded by the frequent establishment of parallel structures. 
There is not yet much evidence on the impact of sectoral programmes, on the
basis of which one can be determine whether their promises have been fulfilled. But I
may just reflect on the possible implications of sectoral programmes for participatory
governance. First, sectoral approaches are based on an agreement between (the united)
donors and a government. Such an agreement will cover many conditions in terms of
required capacity, transparency of budgets, procedures, monitoring and technical as-
sistance (TA), etc. There is however a risk that this (national or state) government as
the 'owner' will be relatively free to implement policy as it deems fit, and/or that it may
(gradually revert to) implement(ing) sectoral policy through a top-down approach to the
neglect of the perceptions, needs and means of the poor. Sectoral policy in fact har-
bours the risk – just like most donor support to date - of supporting centralising tenden-
cies, possibly undermining ongoing or consolidating decentralisation efforts.
This may also conflict with the autonomy of local government, and its freedom
to attach priorities for local planning and budgeting. There appears to be a risk that
sectoral approaches will be a 'vertical' rather than 'horizontal' or integrated planning and
implementation strategy, with the danger that the former ideal of decentralised and 'in-
tegrated development' may be harder to effect (cf. Nielsen, 1999). This points to the
increased need for the poor and other target groups of policy to bring their voice to bear
on the nature and modalities of such sectoral programmes, which are decided and for-
mulated at higher government levels. 
But, on the positive side, this may also be easier: all donor aid is assumed to be
linked in one aid package, and it may be assumed that donors will apply participatory
approaches where possible. In relation to this paper's argument, I may note that this
may offer possibilities to help bring about broad based participatory governance. De8
pending on sector choice and definition, and on the specific role the local government
will play in a given sectoral programme, there should be increased scope to link activi-
ties aimed at the poor - whether aimed at education, water or health - in specific geo-
graphic areas. This may enhance the scope for broad based organisation, and for coop-
eration with local government and NGOs in the area.
2. LOCAL LEVEL INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES 
AND THE NEED FOR PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE
No one will disagree fundamentally with the gist of the good governance
agenda. One problem is that this agenda is so broad so as to make it almost impossible
to implement, where is one to start, what has priority in a specific country? And once
this is known, which instruments or strategies can be applied? The previous section
brought out that the good governance agenda is strongly focused on the state, which is
in line with current donor thinking, as for example reflected by the World Bank (1997).
Within states, donors tend to focus on national and state governments, neglecting the
local level, barring the occasional local government capacity building programme (de
Wit, 1999). There is, in fact, a rather large gap between the large ambitions of the good
governance Agenda and the means to implement it, especially when it comes down to
the local level.
2.1 Good governance strategies
Presently, the main strategies to date to enhance good governance include ca-
pacity building/institutional development; civil service reform (which normally also
addresses issues like accountability, efficiency and combatting corruption); support to
key agencies such as parliaments, courts and Supreme Audit Institutions, and some-
times to elections, and finally  decentralisation. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
look at all these strategies in detail (cf. de Wit, 1998). I may note however that none of
these strategies has proven to be fully effective.  Moore (1995) makes the case that in-
stitutional development cannot, for various reasons, be an effective strategy to bring
about good governance, if only as many institutional development projects have not
been successful. 
Klitgaard quotes documentation indicating that about 90 World Bank supported
Civil Service Reform interventions had not brought about the degree of anticipated
change (Klitgaard, 1997). Reasons for this include that international aid has empha9
sized the supply side of capacity but overlooked the demand; it has distorted local in-
centives, and has been silent about corruption. Moving to decentralisation, it is com-
mon wisdom to say that the potential is high, but that in practice, there are often too
many constraints at various levels to make it fully successful, notwithstanding success
stories (de Wit, 1998a). Especially the most interesting type of decentralisation -
devolution - with most potential for enhancing democracy and participation has proven
very difficult to implement in most cases. To put the case very briefly: 
'In the first place it takes a very politically secure government to parcel out
political power, and it takes more resources than most councils have - or have
been allowed to keep - to effectively manage the responsibilities of a local
council' (Hirschmann 1999: 294).
Obstacles to decentralisation include the lack of financial and incentive systems
at the local level, the lack of sustained interest of politicians and the relative ease with
which strategically placed bureaucrats can hinder or delay decentralisation reforms.
Nevertheless, decentralisation is being implemented in over 63 developing countries,
and it has definitely helped to focus attention to the local level. 
2.2 Participatory governance
In view of the limitations of the most important donor strategies to score much
effect in enhancing good governance, the search is on for alternatives, or for comple-
mentary approaches. This paper wants to explore the scope for what has been called
participatory governance, which is in fact an elaboration and extension of popular par-
ticipation, which often takes place in the context of projects. Starting point is the fol-
lowing statement by Dia (1993: 28), who argues that civil service reforms can only be
successful when there is a ‘reconnect of the state and civil society’:
This goal may be achieved by institutional development strategies which
identify the opportunities within indigenous institutions for building more plu-
ralistic and participatory governance. 
This often means greater devolution and decentralisation to ‘create a more ef-
fective synergy and partnership between the central and the local/traditional govern-
ment institutions’. The theme of ‘participatory governance has been recently picked up
again by Schneider (1999). He also argues for establishing partnerships, and ‘partner-
ship bodies’, through which organisations of the poor and the public sector can co-
operate on a regular basis and thus to ‘mainstream’ participatory governance. They
could institutionalise the sharing of power which is at the heart of participatory govern-
ance (ibid. 531). 10
This paper starts from the view that participatory governance provides many an-
swers to the problems of  poor governance at the local level. However, it is quite an
ambitious strategy, and it is critical to explore to what extent such an ambitious form of
local governance is possible. Hence, I will consider the nature of governance problems
at the local level, the nature of local and indigenous organisations, present efforts aimed
at participation and the role NGOs can play as change agents. It must be recognised
from the start, that this road to participatory governance is complex and risky, taking
place in a very complex environment.  Local organisations, NGOs and donor agencies,
which support such efforts may invest much time and energy which can be in vain due
to unexpected problems or changes be they political or bureaucratic. For that reason, I
will also consider other, potentially more radical approaches to changing local govern-
ment in the form of popular or mass movements, which can influence government from
the outside, and which could still form alliances with other actors or parties (cf.
Schonwalder 1997).
2.3 The importance of the local level
If we consider the list of good governance characteristics in the previous sec-
tion, it is clear that many of these are most relevant for the local level, or, put differ-
ently, are of most importance for the poor, the marginalized and excluded in the vil-
lages and city slums, often not or only marginally affected by policy or law. Besides,
and related to this, poverty reduction, education, health, access to land and credit are all
issues to be dealt with at the local level, including sustainable development (Leach
et.al., 1997). 
The key institution at the local level is the Local Government, strategically
placed between communities and local business on the one hand, and higher levels of
government on the other. Local Governments are generally perceived to be weak in
many developing countries. At the risk of oversimplifying, the problems generally fac-
ing local government can be said to include one or more of the following (de Wit,
1999, Amis, 1997):
•  lack of funds, related to a dependency on funds from central governments and an
inability to locally raise sufficient finance;
•  serious institutional and human resource capacity limitations in terms of number of
staff, staff skills, commitment; a lack of coherent policy frameworks, cumbersome11
procedures; and a lack of proper regulatory frameworks and/or the actual enforce-
ment thereof;
•  fragmentation of decision making within governments, considerable institutional
constraints relating to strong centralisation and hierarchy, and poor coordination
between different local agencies and the local offices of central line ministries;
•  poor staffing and lack of (relevant) skills amongst local officials, related to poor
levels of pay and poorly developed incentive systems; 
•  local government institutions mostly functioning in a routine, 'backward looking
way', mostly trying to achieve tangible, physical policy targets in the context of the
annual budget cycle; much policy aimed at the poor is implemented in a 'top-down'
way;
•  rather than adhering to formal bureaucratic roles and actions, informal patterns of
communication and decision making may dominate, not least the result of undue
political interference, so that policy intentions often differ much from policy out-
comes; this again often results or stimulates (already existing) considerable corrup-
tion and nepotism. 
2.4 Poor local governance: impacts on policy implementation 
It is not surprising that under these conditions, local economic growth has often
been very tardy or non-existent, and that there are large problems as regards policy
formulation and implementation. Related to this, poverty reduction efforts are in many
cases not effective, as I have for example argued with respect to Madras and Bangalore
in India (de Wit, 1996). Even in those cases where projects were properly designed,
policy outcomes differed much from intentions. Factors include a lack of coordination
between different agencies involved, an absence of effective cost-recovery strategies so
that policies are rarely sustainable, a mismatch between policy offered and the needs
and means of the people. Not in the last place, local and state level politicians as well as
local brokers manipulated policies for reasons of narrow political self-interest. 
However, there was a difference in Madras between projects funded with local
funds and projects funded by the World Bank, which included forms of community
participation and community development through community organizers. The latter
projects were much more successful, if only through the community mobilizing and
awareness raising work in the slums, the watchdog function of World Bank missions12
and the 'interface' work including disseminating information by the community organ-
izers (ibid.). This points at the beneficial effects of  (community) organisation, a degree
of transparency, and not least the beneficial ‘watchdog’ function of an outside donor
agency, even in otherwise quite adverse conditions.  
In summary, whereas the local government is the key agency with regard to the
welfare and well-being of the populations of developing countries, it is often also the
weakest institution. The dilemma is then how to devise ways to break -often vicious -
cycles of poor management, insufficient resources, increasing poverty, low taxes, low
or irregular salaries etc. On the other hand, problems are not always only or mainly fi-
nancial, and there is sometimes outright mismanagement, corruption, undue political
interference, nepotism through extended patronage networks etc. Pressure to improve
things, to achieve better governance, can only come from two sides: from below i.e.
(organised) people, and from higher governance and donor levels. I will now consider
the scope of pressure and initiatives from below.
2.5 Civil society
It is often mentioned that civil society can and has to play an important role in
bringing about good governance. It is being recognised that civil society can negotiate
with institutions and bureaucracies, influence public policy and provide a check on the
power of government (OECD, 1995). I will briefly consider the nature of civil society
here, with a focus on the organisations of the poor. Apart from these, there are such lo-
cal organisations as registered political organisations, trade unions, supra-local social
movements and federations, business associations, political parties and the organisa-
tions of the elites. Some of these may play a pro-poor role, others may rather form an
obstacle. It will depend on each case whether such organisations are candidates to join
pro-poor partnerships aiming at participatory governance. 
Turning to the organisations of the poor, a distinction is often made between
formal and informal organisations, whereby developmental and donor agencies have
mostly relied on what Cleaver (1999) calls 'committee like' formal organisations, which
are modern, and which are assumed to be stronger than the 'traditional', or informal or-
ganisations. It is nevertheless useful to draw attention to the existence and possible po-
tential of informal organisations as part of civil society, in line with what Dia (1996)
has done for Sub Saharan Africa. 13
2.6 Formal and informal organisations
In a relatively black and white ideal-typical argument, Dia (1996) argues that
many African countries are characterised by an institutional disconnect between formal
modern institutions transplanted from the outside, and indigenous, informal institutions
characterising the civil society and reflecting its culture and tradition (ibid: 3). Formal
institutions include the entire Government machinery with all ministries and line agen-
cies down to the officials in deconcentrated offices, but also banks, financial institu-
tions and development agencies. These institutions do not function well, and face a cri-
sis of legitimacy and enforcement. In contrast, there are informal, endogenous or tradi-
tional institutions including informal savings groups, micro-enterprises, village level
indigenous groups, councils or committees. Such institutions are rooted in local culture
and values, and they are characterised by legitimacy, accountability, and self-
enforcement. Besides, they have a strong hold over people's commitment, dedication
and sense of identity. Dia notes the possibility that such institutions have dysfunctional,
undesirable characteristics, and may for example discriminate in terms of gender. 
Dia argues that neither institution is adequate itself: formal institutions should
become more responsive and marked by more legitimacy and accountability; informal
institutions have to renovate, be flexible, and adjust to challenges and changes in the
wider environment. He believes that such 'institutional reconciliation' is the key to re-
solving the crisis of institutional capacity in Africa. Dia's analysis is useful in that it
draws attention to often neglected, but locally potentially important organisations
which can be or become agents of development, or which can point at ways in which
development could be brought about more effectively. For example, further research
may teach us much about appropriate mechanisms and approaches relating to partici-
pation - and not necessarily community participation. After all, many such groups op-
erate at a lower, sub-community level, so that the normal complications of working at
the community level do not always have to apply. Such organisations, and the percep-
tions and institutionalised practices and expertise of the members can be and should be
starting points for participatory and 'bottom' up approaches.
This is not to deny that there are problems with Dia's analysis as there are not
such clear demarcations between, in reality, many different types of organisations,
while he does not sufficiently indicate that formal institutions have been invaded and
permeated with both positive and negative traits of his informal, indigenous institutions
(e.g. Riggs’ Prismatic Society). And, in practical terms, it will not exactly be easy to14
identify and deal with the indigenous institutions, for example in terms of communica-
tion, in view of the varying degrees of illiteracy and the incidence of oral traditions in
some countries. Also, it will be no mean task to bring about the ‘connect’ between for-
mal and informal institutions; many communities and groups are hardly in contact with
state or formal institutions, how to reach them? Who will take on this laborious work
and then proceed to consider the informal institutions in terms of positive and negative
traits; bring about adjustment and then make the link? Finally, he may well overesti-
mate the potential of such indigenous or informal organisations, which often only exist
- and are successful - for one single reason, for example a water user or savings group.
Nevertheless, Dia’s work is important as it recognizes the existence of mostly neglected
endogenous organisations and institutions, and their importance and potential. The is-
sue was picked up also by Schneider (1999), and, as we will see later, is important to
Bolivia’s decentralisation and participation policy. 
2.7 Access and the importance of patronage
Having made a distinction between formal and less formal grass-roots organi-
sations, I will briefly look at relationships between the poor and local government
(agencies). This will help assess the scope for the poor to organise – or to link their
(in)formal organisations to governments. This would in turn facilitate their participation
in forms of participatory governance. From the point of view of the poor, linking with
an agency means getting access. There are three possibilities: direct access by the poor
to relevant agencies; access to agencies mediated by mediators, brokers, leaders (either
political or non-political); and access to agencies mediated by NGOs.
It seems safe to say that most poor – and especially those most poor - in devel-
oping countries face problems in getting access to agencies: whether they are in need of
employment, a pension, a housing plot or loan. Since the demand for most of these
commodities at any given time is larger than the supply, there will be shortages, leading
to bureaucratic ways to manage and control the distribution, through waiting lists,
queues, lotteries etc. So the first access possibility mentioned does not often apply, and
the third one, i.e. that NGOs mediate is probably also a limited option seen from the
perspective of a person in any slum or village in a given developing country. Rather, all
over the world, there are queues, waiting lists, and there are mediators. 
Mediating can be done on an incidental basis, but more often it appears that
patterns develop, that certain persons mediate for certain others, depending on locality,15
price, loyalty, perceived efficacy which may often be related to political affiliation. Put
briefly, institutionalised mediation is very important for the poor in patronage relation-
ships. Patronage will be called clientelism in the case when votes are exchanged for
favours - a strategy applied by politicians to attract votes (Gay, 1998: 7). The scope for
clientelism is a function of the lack of enforced impersonal rules for the allocation of
resources (ibid: 48).   
Patronage is a good example of a very important, widely prevalent informal, in-
digenous relationship, an institution in itself. It is endogenously enforced, and upheld
by mutual agreement among the social actors involved, even though the relationship
can be exploitative. It is fundamentally based on, but also sustains a difference of
power, as it is governed by norms and actions leading to the widespread construction
and enforcement of social inequality (cf. Kabeer et al. 1996: 18). Patronage may easily
lead to corruption, for example when a mediator and an official divide the 'fee' to help a
poor household obtain a loan or housing plot, but this need not be so. Consider the case
where only the mediator asks for a (modest, and perhaps deserved/well earned) fee and
not the official. However, since patronage/ clientelism is not governed by the rule of
law, it must be admitted that there is ample scope for misuse; and this is in fact what
happens in most developing countries (cf. Bretas, 1996, de Wit, 1996).  
For our purpose of exploring the scope for participatory governance, it may be
noted that it is important to look beyond the 'formal' institutions normally involved in
donor programmes, and to explore the potential of informal and indigenous institutions.
However, as noted, care must be taken not to idealise or mystify such institutions: they
may harbour negative characteristics, e.g. in the field of gender, accountability or cor-
ruption. Next, account should be taken of the coping strategies of the poor, which in-
clude using vertical - rather than horizontal/collective action like - relationships to get
things done. Participatory approaches require equality: it cannot be that the poor are
represented by their patrons or brokers. Therefore, while designing and implementing
such approaches these facts must be kept in mind. 
3. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND THE ROLE OF NGOS
With a view to exploring the scope for participatory governance, I will now
critically look at the present most prevalent form of participation: community partici-
pation in the context of various types of development projects and programmes. Subse-
quently, this section considers the role of NGOs as regards community participation,16
and assesses in a general way to what extent they are in a position to become key
agents or change agents in more comprehensive participatory approaches. Can they be
part of and help form tripartite partnerships with local government and the poor and
their organisations?
3.1 Community Participation: conceptual problems
Various definitions of community participation circulate, referring to varying
degrees of involvement of the public in various stages of public policy and administra-
tion. In fact, the concept is being used so often and refers to so many different things
that it may often be almost meaningless when it comes to implementation. The distinc-
tion between participation for efficiency (a means) and participation for empowerment
(as a goal) is however useful by way of initial ordering. 
Participation as a means to an end includes consultation (on conditions, needs,
means and priorities) and the participation of target groups in the actual implementation
of projects and programmes (labour, finance), leading to increased project effective-
ness, efficiency and project cost sharing (de Wit, 1996: 55). Much attention is presently
given to participation  in consultation through various types of participatory assessment
approaches of which the most known are the Participatory Rural Assessment ap-
proaches (PRA; there is also the Participatory Urban Appraisal, PUA). For an impres-
sively long list of various such assessments I refer to Guijt and Shah (1998: 268). 
The reason why PRA type approaches have become so popular and why they
have also been embraced by development agencies like the World Bank is that they are
relatively easily to implement and that they do give a voice to the poor and vulnerable
in the slums and villages of developing countries. They are effective for people indi-
cating their needs, means and priorities, and to bring out (power) differences between
residents for example by the method of wealth ranking. Such approaches may lead to
better and, particularly more appropriate - plans and project proposals, but there is also
a risk that community differences ultimately disappear into the melting pot of an 'aver-
age community plan' (Guijt and Shah, 1998). In general, PRA may not always succeed
in placing internal community divisions on the local agenda, or be the basis for acting
on this agenda in concrete terms, particularly where specific issues of women, marginal
and/or excluded groups in terms of ethnicity, caste, income, age are concerned (cf. de
Wit, 1997)17
'For PRA to live up to its aim, it must be part of this longer-term process of
challenging inequalities and go beyond the moments of data collection, visual
documentation and instant analysis' (Guijt and Shah, 1998: 11). 
3.2 Empowerment
Other authors see community participation as an end itself; they advocate the
empowerment of people and communities, which refers to issues such as: an increased
level of awareness, increased decision making and countervailing power, more assets,
and improved access to resources and institutions. This conception of participation is of
relevance for this paper, especially its connotation with participation as a self-
generating activity and a learning process, stimulating people to seek participation also
in other spheres of life. However, this latter and most ambitious type of participation-
cum-empowerment is obviously most difficult to bring into practice, certainly if - as it
is mostly the case - takes place in the context of a time bound project (de Wit, 1997). 
Cleaver (1999: 599) is critical of empowerment as a buzzword in development.
She feels that it has lost its radical, challenging and transformatory edge, that
empowerment has been de-politicised. In practice, it is often not so clear who is to be
empowered, the individual, the community or groups like women. Besides, the impli-
cations of empowerment are not always thought through: what do empowered people
do after a project is over, when, for example a newly created local women organisation
is dismantled (cf. Edwards et.al. 1999: 121). 
3.3 Problematic communities
Another key problem relating to community participation is that it starts from
the assumption of a community, which is almost always problematic. Etzioni (in Guijt
and Shah, 1998: 8) lists some problems related to the concept of community: 
•  community is poorly defined, leading to confusion and a lack of focus for action
•  communities never existed in the way people romanticize them today;
•  due to the focus on majority rule in community processes, minority groups may
lose out; and
•  a community focus may be culturally oppressive if members experiences social
pressure to abide by cultural norms and rules that are not truly shared. 
In summary, communities are neither homogenous nor harmonious entities. There are
divisions, there are institutionalised inequalities and related conflicts (cf. Leach et al.
1997: 10-11). 18
So if community participation is successful in contributing to better project and
policy outcomes, it may mean that the community leaders have performed well (but
perhaps also benefited most) or that the majority of the population has benefited, but
not necessarily the most needy, poor or marginalised. It may also mean that some
groups participated much more than others, and that groups participated separately and
in different ways such as the men and the women as indicated by Guijt and Shah (1999:
9-10). Other factors impinging on the efficacy of community participation include the
nature of the project or activities for which participation is sought; the important and
often neglected element of individual cost-benefit calculation in participation; people
will probably only invest time and resources if this is in their own interest. However,
contrary to general thinking, they may also do so for reasons of respect, social norms or
recognition (Cleaver, 1999: 606). Not least, the local political context is critically im-
portant: whether or not local level leadership supports a participatory process or
whether this is dominated, manipulated and appropriated by them (de Wit, 1997: 31).
Guijt and Shah (ibid.) argue that generalising words like 'participation' and
'community' may hinder professionals to be aware of intra-communal struggles, notably
the micro-politics of gender relations. Cleaver (ibid.) feels that participation is focused
too much on 'toolboxes' and on 'getting the techniques right' and on avoiding issues of
power and politics. More seriously, she found little evidence of the long term effective-
ness of participation as regards materially improving the conditions of the most vulner-
able people, as a strategy for social change, or as a strategy for empowerment. 
3.4 Limitations of community participation
The scope for effective community participation is strongly influenced by the
internal composition and homogeneity of what is taken to be the community, the inter-
nal power configurations, and the nature of the participatory activity. On the one hand,
participatory approaches are an essential component of effective, need based and sus-
tainable policy and projects, but, on the other hand, there are quite a few limitations.
Community participation and empowerment approaches have been mostly applied in
the context of scattered, isolated projects and have therefore been too fragmented, and
rarely sustainable. It is not easy for 'communities', divided as they are - to hold on to
the gains - particularly in terms of new attitudes, activities, perceptions - after projects
are complete. Another limitation of community participation is that it can only do so
much to solve the local problems, as these are critically related to or a result of struc19
tural factors outside the control of the local community. Or, in terms of Braden and
Mayo (1999: 197)
Practising representation of a genuinely participatory nature needs to begin at
the local level, and to be continued, to enable people to address the various
layers of authority which affect their lives - from those within their own
neighbourhoods, through to local authorities and policy makers. Practitioners
need to address issues of who is being represented and who is listening. 
Clearly, projects are too limited a context for this. 
3.5 The role of local (southern) NGDOs 
It is important to briefly consider the NGOs, as they have been implementers of
participatory and empowerment approaches in may countries, and as they have become
major players in the field of service provision to the poor at the local level. Indeed,
their multi-layered linkages from the micro to the local, national and international level
make them important potential agents for change. Theirs, ideally, is the role to dissemi-
nate information and to explore and implement new approaches and to form innovative
institutional frameworks. But are they up to such tasks? 
Available evidence suggests that most NGOs in developing countries are active
in the field of providing basic and social services acting as 'service delivery contractors'
(Edwards and Hulme, 1996). To a lesser extent NGOs aim to improve the overall posi-
tion of the poor, increasing their assets, assisting them to have a voice, a level of secu-
rity and equality of rights. This involves developing skills, confidence, capacities, and
access to credit, services and economic opportunities. However, it appears that many
NGOs have been unwilling to co-operate with national and local government partly due
to deep-rooted (often justified) suspicions. On the other hand, local government may be
suspicious of NGOs, doubting their capacity, sustainability, even sincerity (de Wit,
1997). But there are also problems in NGO linking to communities. Edwards et. al.
(1999: 131) are quite critical of the willingness of southern NGOs to implement par-
ticipatory approaches to involve communities in deciding about NGO activities and
policy (directions): 'few NGOs have developed structures that respond to grassroots
demands'. Besides, there are the more general questions pertaining to NGOs of  ac-
countability (may be more towards donors than towards the target groups); their legiti-
macy, their ability to complete tasks in a community and to move on; their reach; the
sustainability of their organisations and their achievements, also in terms of the will-
ingness of municipalities to maintain tangible improvements implemented. 
Then it is important for our argument to consider formal partnerships between20
Governments and NGOs. There is evidence of some examples and experiments, and
these present a mixed picture (HIC, 1997). It appears as if there has been relatively lit-
tle progress in establishing pro-poor alignments between different NGOs, between
NGOs and other civil society organisations, and between civil society, business and
government. NGOs have not been that active in fields like addressing corruption, to
press for institutional accountability and to work towards a social consensus in favour
of economic reform (Edwards et. al. 1999: 121). Desai (1999: 264) mentions that
NGOs working in Bombay - and Southern NGOs in general - have little attention for
'analysing the broader policy issues which have a bearing on their mostly micro-level,
poverty alleviation interventions, and to seeking to influence government policies
which have a direct bearing on the lives and incomes of poor people'. 
Generally, there appear to be only few NGOs directly involved in addressing
the large inequalities at the local level, in the struggle against corruption, nepotism and
mismanagement. It appears that fewer NGOs are nowadays active in the field of advo-
cacy and empowerment, aimed at  making it easier for the poor and their (formal or in-
formal) organisations to put pressure on local government themselves. Rather, more
and more NGOs are active in the field of service delivery, perhaps related to the fact
that NGOs are now fully accepted development partners by all donor agencies, leading
to lesser degree of politically oriented or radical activity. This should in fact lead to
more scope for LG-NGO partnerships, for lobbying with local governments, but there
is not that much evidence for this. Desai (ibid.) agrees that it is increasingly necessary
for NGOs to harmonise their development efforts with those of government and with
other agencies working in the same locality. 
3.6 Summary
This section was a cursory and perhaps over-generalised attempt to examine the
broad field of community participation and NGOs, with a view to assess their relevance
for bringing about participatory governance. On the basis of the scattered documenta-
tion used, it was first noted that current participatory approaches have important limita-
tions, particularly the fact that they often take place in the context of isolated projects,
failing to address critical and political issues outside projects and beyond the commu-
nity level. NGOs were shown to be important actors at the grassroots level, especially
important for service delivery for the poor, but less so where effective empowerment
approaches and forging partnerships beyond communities are concerned. Indeed, just21
like donor agencies, NGOs also seem to prefer to work alone, which is related of course
to donor requirements to report on individual NGO achievements, and a concern to
make sure that 'its' aid is identifiable. 
So for NGOs to be effective partners in participatory governance, they will need
to effect operational and policy changes and to even reform themselves, which is also
the gist of much of the literature. Where the Netherlands is concerned, this realisation
may have to play a role in the discussion the Minister will have with the Dutch Co-
Financing Agencies (Novib, Cordaid,  ICCO, Hivos) about the complementarity of the
official bilateral aid channel and the NGO channel (cf. section 1).
4. EXAMPLES OF PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE
Having examined the limitations of the regular community participation ap-
proaches in view of the need to bring about or more comprehensive participatory gov-
ernance or good governance, I will now, by way of illustration, examine a few exam-
ples of frameworks of structures which were deliberately created to introduce this.
Moving from small to large scale, I will respectively deal with the Bangalore Poverty
Alleviation Programme (a limited pilot donor funded programme), the Porto Alegre
participatory budgeting methodology (city wide approach), and the ambitious national
decentralisation reforms aimed at participatory governance in Bolivia. Finally, by way
of contrast, I will briefly examine an approach aimed at combating corruption which
was not initiated officially. This is the case of a mass movement in India, which was
successful in contributing to local level good governance, be it in a very forceful way -
but perhaps this is the only effective way. 
The cases should not be read as detailed descriptions or as final and most up to
date reports. Rather, the emphasis is on the preconditions and the way participatory
governance is formulated, structured and implemented. 
4.1 The Bangalore Urban Poverty Alleviation Programme (BUPP). 
The Dutch funded BUPP programme was implemented between 1993 and 1999
in the Indian city of Bangalore as a pilot project to test the model of an innovative sus-
tainable, participatory poverty reduction approach. The programme had the following
key-features. First, it was an example of a public-private partnership. It was imple-
mented by a tripartite Steering committee, including representatives of various Gov-
ernment agencies (municipality, land registration office, women welfare department,22
slum improvement board), representatives of the many NGOs working in the city's
slums, and of the slum based GROs. Secondly, the core of the programme were the
newly created and locally elected 'Slum Development Teams' with mixed make/female
membership, which engaged in participatory needs assessment, and in 'bottom-up'
planning and implementation. Third, an explicit objective of the programme was the
‘convergence’ or linking/integration of the diverse programmes, policies and funds of
both governmental and non-governmental organisations, with the active involvement of
and contributions by slum communities. A small Project Support Unit helped imple-
ment the programme and was charged to facilitate and enhance the quality of work of
involved organisations. 
The programme was marked then by an ambitious form of devolution of power
and funds to local level slum bodies, which were made their own slum plans. These
were submitted to the Steering Committee for approval, possible adjustment and fund-
ing. Government agencies and NGOs jointly supported these slum efforts and projects,
funded with a mix of (Dutch) programme funds, local government funds and commu-
nity contribution. The programme recognised that most participatory approaches have
not led to the development of sufficient 'countervailing and claim-making powers'
amongst the poor, to match the overriding influence of political and other elites' (de
Wit, 1997: 13). Hence, the core objective of BUPP was to empower the poor, by en-
hancing levels of awareness and organisation, and by assisting them to increase their
skills and assets.
The programme had the ambition to develop into a city-wide approach, but the
model did not prove as successful as had been anticipated. It did achieve much in terms
of the degree of grassroots participation in planning and implementation (constructing
community halls and toilets, saving groups) and, perhaps to a lesser extent in terms of
'empowerment' if defined in ambitious terms of ‘countervailing power’. If defined in
terms of more assets, information, assertiveness, improved access, surely much was
achieved, even though involving women in the Slum Development Teams proved diffi-
cult. Problems however remained with the relatively complex programme structure,
and with programme 'ownership'. 
This was related to uneasy relations and mutual suspicions between Govern-
ment agencies and NGOs/GROs, so that the ideal of the convergence of programmes
and funds did not sufficiently materialise. But the full development of these partner-
ships was also impeded by the time it took to change procedures, to chance attitudes23
and mind-sets. After all, a relative radical change was envisioned from fairly top-down
and inflexible bureaucratic approaches to quite flexible, multi-stakeholder, bottom-up
approaches. There was reluctance on the part of the government to fully support (and to
institutionalise) the relative ambitious decentralisation of decision-making and funds to
the newly created Slum Development Teams. (de Wit, 1997). While there was collec-
tive, horizontal mobilisation of slum people, the urban poor in the end started to per-
ceive and use the programme and the Programme Support Unit as yet another (vertical)
access channel to the locally available funds, projects and opportunities (De Wit and
Krishnamurthy, 2000).
4.2 Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre
In 1988 the Brazilian Workers Party won the local elections in the Brazilian city
of Porto Alegre, and it subsequently introduced the so called 'Participatory Budgeting
Approach'. The approach representS a framework in which the city's residents can pri-
oritise the needs to be addressed with available funds, and decide as to how the city
budget will be spent. Participatory budgeting starts with the election of representatives
of each of the 16 regions in which the city has been divided. Two of these representa-
tives from each region are elected (but for only one year) into the city wide 'Participa-
tory Budget Council' (PBC). This Council is charged with the task to manage those
municipal budgets available for services and infrastructure in the local areas. This
amounts to about 20-30% of the entire city budget, the remainder being used for sala-
ries, overheads and larger scale/ city wide infrastructure and investments. Apart from
this council, Thematic Plenary Sessions (e.g. focusing on public transport and traffic
and health care, or on social assistance) have been established to deal with basic and
urgent issues to be addressed at the city wide level and to decide on long term strategic
plans for the city.
The PBC meets almost once weekly, and sets the agenda for municipal spend-
ing by making the list of priorities for public works, whereby it is obviously critical that
the budget is applied/ distributed in a transparent and equitable way. For that reason a
system of 'weighting' has been developed, based on the percentage of the population,
the ratio of the area of the region lacking urban services, the total population of the re-
gion and the priorities set by he PBC (Conger, 1999). However, the final decisions on
municipal spending are made in a three-way meeting which include the mayor's office,
the PBC members and the councillors who have been elected in the general municipal24
elections. The latter can modify and amend the investment plan suggested by the PBC,
but they cannot make fundamental changes. In Porto Alegre the participatory budget
approach is quite successful, and is valued highly by almost all citizens. It has been in-
troduced later also in Belo Horizonte (Bretas, 1996) and in some 50 other Brazilian
cities.
The participatory budget approach has led to a more equitable service delivery,
with slums often receiving more funds due to having a higher weighting. People have
become empowered through having real decision making power and powers to super-
vise and monitor policy implementation. The system represents a drastic change to-
wards participatory democracy. It was deliberately intended by the Workers Party to
replace the previous 'paternalistic model' of governance, based on clientelist strategies
with the co-option of community leadership: the resident's votes were bought in ex-
change for government action. Preconditions for the methodology are political will, the
regionalisation of the city, definition of transparent criteria to distribute municipal re-
sources, adjusting (the attitudes of) the local bureaucrats, and the active involvement of
the elected councillors, who are willing to forfeit some of their previously considerable
power (Bretas, 1999). Available evidence does not indicate as to whether all council-
lors are actually playing such very constructive roles, whether patronage still plays a
role (perhaps after adjustment to the new arrangements) and whether there is less cor-
ruption today. These of course are important questions, but perhaps existing documen-
tation tends to display participatory budgeting as a so called ‘best practice’.
4.3 Bolivia's popular participation
In 1994 the then Bolivian Government enacted the Population Participation Act,
and in 1995 the Decentralisation Act. The latter acts regulates the national, administra-
tive dimensions of the delegation of powers and funds from the national to regional
(departmental) and municipal levels. The Participation Act formalises decentralisation
'from the bottom up', and deals with the setting up of participatory mechanisms and
structures. The acts aim to enable both the urban population and the rural indigenous
population to participate actively in socio-economic policy. A new administrative layer
of 309 municipalities is formed, which are responsible both for the urban and sur-
rounding rural areas. Hereby, formerly neglected rural communities obtain more influ-
ence on policy. The elected Mayor and Municipal councils are responsible for financial
management, for establishing participatory governance structures, and also for manag25
ing infrastructure, education, health etc. Municipalities are allocated 20% of the Na-
tional budget for the relevant sectors (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996). 
Participation in and monitoring policy formulation and implementation are
critical areas in the new structures. Existing grassroots organisations and co-operative
structures can register as 'Territorially Based Organisations' (OTBs) and so obtain a le-
gal status. Through these organisations they can make their voice heard in the munici-
pal Council, and influence the planning of activities by indicating their priorities. Su-
pervisory or Watchdog Committees (Comites de Vigilancia) are elected from the OTBs
which are charged with closely monitoring the Council. They check the equitable allo-
cation of resources in urban and rural areas, the proper application of the law, which
includes the principle of equal opportunity for women, youth and the elderly. The legal
provisions governing the municipal level 'reconcile indigenous and Western principles
of administration, and have set in motion a reform process aiming to reverse the his-
torical pattern of political and economic exclusion of large parts of the indigenous
population' (Schneider, 1999: 526).
It is as yet too early to assess the impact of Bolivia's far reaching reforms in
terms of actual participatory governance and empowerment. The decentralisation
structures have been established, but some delay in implementation was reported fol-
lowing the change of government. Obviously, progress differs from region to region,
from municipality to municipality, and also depends on the degree of donor or NGO
support. On the positive side there are indications that more funds are available locally,
that the extent of corruption has been reduced and that formerly powerless grassroots
organisations have been empowered to decide on municipal affairs. On the other hand,
there are reports on a proliferation of corruption to the municipal level, and a continued
(but changed) high level of political interference, with autocratic politicians reluctant to
really give up power over municipal funds. Patronage is still very important even under
present conditions, and there are reports of politicians who misuse the funds available
for local programmes for their own benefit. The watchdog committee members are of-
ten unable to prevent this: they may be co-opted, are ill-informed or, being new to poli-
tics, they are overruled or threatened by vested interests. 
4.4 The MKSS mass movement in Rajasthan, India
I will now finally present a somewhat different but important example of a par-
ticipatory approach to enhance good governance at the local level, one that - in contrast26
to the above three cases - took place outside the realm of the state, not supported - or
hindered? or neutralized? - by officials or donors. It is the case of a mass based organi-
sation which effectively addressed grassroots corruption. The case is described by Roy
(1999) who argues that, in India, there is widespread corruption from the national, state
government levels to the level of village government functionaries and elected repre-
sentatives of the village councils: 
300 million poor people believe that 'the public coffers are being looted, and
that the money earmarked for development is going to ...the rich and power-
ful. The law makers and law enforcers are also the law breakers and no one in
the government can touch them'....'There is no transparency and no account-
ability at the level where it counts the most - where the buck stops.' (ibid).
In the early 1990s, the Labour Farmer's Organisation (MKSS) started to work
with the poor in one of the most backward areas of the state of Rajasthan. The few
MKSS activists did not write project proposals, did not register, took no foreign funds
and did not employ staff. They went from village to village asking people whether they
knew how much money came to their village for development and how it was spent;
people indicated they did not know and never dared to ask. MKSS then proceeded to
the regional development office to request village-specific information on development
funds, but this was refused. Subsequently, MKSS organised mass rallies, public cam-
paigns, hearings on corruption cases and protest actions in the state. These campaign
resulted in the State Government making available written evidence and documentation
on village level expenditures in terms of bills, vouchers and muster rolls, which was
also handed to MKSS. 
However, in spite of a relevant government order, the information was not made
public in villages, neither by the village officials nor by the elected representatives. The
MKSS then started to organise public hearings in various villages, aimed at making
public the discrepancies between the officially reported and actual spending patterns of
development funds. Even before the hearing started, in one village a village official re-
turned Rs. 100,000 to the village council, promising to pay 100,000 later. In another
village, under pressure from the people and public exposure and humiliation, an elected
village council member publicly returned Rs. 147,000. 
Roy (1999) is critical of the belated and sudden attention amongst donors and
policy makers for transparency and accountability. He feels that 'the answer is not
stronger laws, stricter punishment and more visits to the villages to supervise and look
at the account books', neither to employ more national or international experts. Being27
fully distrustful of the state and its offices, he feels the only answer lays outside the
state, with the strength of people organised on a large scale. This only will bring about
and sustain the change of attitudes amongst officials, who know that they are under
close observation. 
4.5 Observations
The following observations can be made on the basis of these cases.
a. Actual and effective decentralisation is a necessary condition for all successful cases,
i.e. Porto Alegre and Bolivia. The problems in BUPP can be partly explained by a
lack of commitment on the part of local government to support the decentralisation
of powers and funds to slum teams. Related to this, sufficient resources must be
made available to the local level; 
b. In such a decentralised context, an active involvement of the people is essential,
which is again related to literacy, access to information and transparency in terms of
the income and expenses of local government. Often there seems to be an initially
difficult starting point, when people invest in an approach without clear benefits; if
these become visible, approaches become sustainable; 
c. There is often a change agent, a person, party or group which sets things in motion,
and this can be critical in terms of ownership and sustainability. In Porto Alegre this
was the Workers Party, in Rajasthan the MKSS. It has been argued that there were
ownership problems with the BUPP programme, which may help explain some of
the problems faced. In the context of the Bolivian decentralisation reforms, an active
initiating, mobilising and stimulating role of dynamic persons or groups at the local
level has shown to be important. For the poor, the illiterate, and marginalised groups
like women it may not be enough if the opportunity is there; they may have to be as-
sisted to seize it.
c. Political will of central and state authorities; the active involvement of the elected
councillors;
d. This political support should then facilitate bureaucratic reforms. Concrete attention,
time and resources are needed to adjust attitudes of, and to change incentive systems
for local bureaucrats, to affect a change over from a 'top-down' to a 'bottom-up' atti-
tude. 
e. In conditions where there is no benevolent state or agency to stimulate or introduce
good governance or participatory governance, and where people are illiterate and28
powerless, a change agent in the form of a GRO or NGO is needed to bring about
change. These organisations should possess a variety of skills relating to communi-
cation with the people and to political negotiations. 
f. Generally, even though not (yet) in the case of the MKSS, it would be important for
GROs and NGOs to have the skills to conduct policy consultations with senior bu-
reaucrats and planners, and to develop workable alternatives to their current pro-
grammes and frameworks for effective co-operation. 
g. Finally, and generally, local government (agencies), local politicians and NGOs must
be willing to cease to deal in a paternalistic manner with community organisations,
the poor and illiterate, and start to deal with them on an equal basis, as partners. Les-
sons can and must be learnt both ways; people must be allowed and enabled to grow
into new roles.
To summarise, it must be noted that the efforts to bring about and to sustain
participatory governance  - if and once successful  - bring large rewards in terms of ef-
ficiency, accountability and transparency. Not least, they were shown to have positive
effects on the nature of policy implementation and on poverty reduction. However, it
must be realised that these are very laborious and time consuming efforts, taking place
in very complex environments and involving many stakeholders with diverse interests.
And without political and central government support, such efforts may easily fail. So
before embarking on this road full of pitfalls, local organisations and NGOs - and do-
nors if they want to be involved - must make a careful assessment of the prospects for
participatory models. 
The case of MKSS shows another, effective but more radical way to go: to ef-
fect chance in governance through mass movements from outside the state. This may
be a viable and sometimes unavoidable approach, which seems to have impacts espe-
cially in Latin America. Local organisations can join larger and mass movements,
which then may have various options in order to bring about change (Schonwalder,
1997). Some larger movements are based on patronage networks, and are effective in
pressurising local government (Gay, 1998).29
5. TOWARDS INSTITUTIONALIZING GOOD GOVERNANCE AT THE 
LOCAL LEVEL: PEOPLE CENTRED APPROACHES AND THE ROLE 
OF DONORS
In the course of this paper, I have noted the limitations of various current ap-
proaches aimed at local government capacity building, community participation and
empowerment with a view to enhance or to bring about good governance at the local
level. The present section starts from these limitations to address the question: what
role can donors play to be effective in this regard, and what are the issues which they
will have to face?
Starting with the latter point, it must be again emphasised that this paper has
once again brought out the inherently political nature of attempts to support good gov-
ernance. Current attempts to achieve sustainable development through community par-
ticipation and empowerment have been disappointing, precisely as these did not ad-
dress the structural issues of power, of excessive and counterproductive political inter-
ference, of inequality. Donor support was often supply driven, and the activities of the
World Bank and other donors have in fact increased capacity problems in many coun-
tries (World Bank, 1996: vii). As a result, the wrong approaches were applied, with too
much reliance on not always effective TA. Often not the most essential or most effec-
tive institutions were supported (Moore, 1995). Donors will just have to be more criti-
cal, have to listen not only to central and local governments, but also to the people: too
often even democratically elected governments do not take the interest and well-being
of their people at heart. 
Apart from the need to be critical, donor agencies have to be careful: they are
raising high expectations, having come very near to publicly admitting the truth of the
matter: that there is just too much mismanagement but also indifference and greed in
relation to governance in too many countries and that they will no longer be silent party
to this. They have indicated to be serious in their intentions to address these issues,
which is a daunting as well as politically sensitive challenge. 
But by implication, donor countries have implicitly accepted the responsibility
to practice, or to strife for good governance themselves: to reduce their military expen-
ditures and to practise and advocate human rights. Perhaps more important is that they
not only advocate and bring into bring about political freedom internationally but also
economic freedom, in terms of those features of globalisation, global trade systems and
capital movements which are detrimental to poor countries. Finally, and after many30
years of promises and good intentions, donor agencies should be serious about effecting
donor co-ordination, the lack of which presently leads to many (sometimes baffling)
cases of poor development administration, seen from the recipient country's point of
view. In this respect, it will be interesting to see to what extent this can be realised as
an important component of sectoral approaches. 
Keeping these generalities in mind, I will now briefly discuss various possibili-
ties for donors to (help) initiate or to support participatory governance processes. I will
start with some suggestions relating to the poor and their grassroots organisations,
move on to Civil Society organisations, and finally look at the most important institu-
tion: local government. 
5.1 The poor and their informal organisations
- the importance of education for the poor cannot be over-estimated, and it is critical
that literacy is recognized as a basic precondition for good governance by all donor
agencies. Literacy opens the way to information, to transparency and accountability,
apart from having overall beneficial effect in terms of empowerment, health and the
position of women and girls. 
- It would be very important if low income people were able to organise beyond the
limits of their community, if their (informal, 'indigenous') organisations such as
savings and credit groups, user groups, and local village or slum organisations could
join to form a federation or mass movement (cf. the case of MKSS, and of the Bo-
livian local organisations). This would increase their bargaining power, not only as
regards their own local government, but also higher levels of government where
more important decisions about them are taken. There is a danger that such federa-
tions are again co-opted by competing political parties seeking support through cli-
entelism. The examples from Brazil mentioned by Gay (1999) indicate that this need
not always be the case.
- The core argument of this paper is that participatory governance is the key to im-
proved policy implementation and poverty reduction. I am fully in line then with
Anzorena et.al. (1998: 176), that 'external agencies would be far more effective in
reducing poverty in urban (JW: and rural) areas if their actions strengthened the ca-
pacity of low income groups to negotiate with local authorities and to reach agree-
ments on partnerships'. Donors may find it difficult to develop modalities to become
involved at this local level, but this may change with the increased popularity of31
sectoral approaches. Besides, what is needed is not large interventions, but small
scale 'model building' projects which initiate processes, much like what was in-
tended under the BUPP programme in section four. If proven successful, such mod-
els could be replicated /scaled up. 
- Direct links between the poor and local government are preferable to the opaque op-
eration of brokers and to relying on patronage systems. However, under conditions
of scarcity it is too much to expect that these will disappear and it may be possible to
identify or design patronage systems that are less exploitative in economic terms;
- As an alternative to exploitative brokers or village/slum leaders it would be useful for
local government to appoint officials as 'community agents' or to appoint se-
lected/suitable community residents as 'community organisers' to work as an inter-
face agents between local agencies and the poor. Their key tasks would be dissemi-
nating information, help organise people inside but also across communities, and
provide access to agencies when needed. This would be a potentially effective and
relatively very cheap method for donors to support local government policy imple-
mentation, community initiatives and empowerment (if compared to expensive TA).
For a model of such an arrangement see the case of the Community Development
Wing in the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board (India) (de Wit, 1996: 120ff).
5.2 Civil Society and NGOs
- NGOs need to start building partnerships with local governments and community
groups with a view to bring about local participatory governance and to be in a
stronger position to influence policies and programmes (cf. HIC, 1997). There is as
yet a lack of effective frameworks or models for such partnerships, and various
NGOs in one district or one city should join forces to discuss partnership modalities
and joint action, which for example happened in Bangalore before and during the
implementation of BUPP. Such frameworks and models should also be disseminated
nationally and internationally. So far southern NGOs have few forums to reflect on
their experiences and to articulate an independent voice; 
- This is linked to the following statement by Edwards et.al. (1999: 130): 'By sinking
roots into their own societies and making connections with others inside and outside
civil society, NGOs can generate more potential to influence things where it really
matters because of the multiplier effects that come from activating a concerned citi-
zenry to work for change in a wider range of settings';32
- Donors may need to develop new channels through which they can reach low income
groups and community organisations, not only to support them but also to identify
new initiatives and forms of local co-operation. Increased co-operation between Do-
nor Agencies, Northern NGOs and Southern NGOs may just be the obvious answer.
Perhaps this is what the new Netherlands Minister of Development Co-operation
had in mind when she indicated closer co-operation between her Ministry and the
Netherlands NGOs (the co-financing agencies such as Novib and Bilance). 
5.3 The Local Government 
This paper starts from the view that it is absolutely essential to maintain a focus
on governance and governments in view of their (re)distributive and protective func-
tions which remain essential, whatever implications globalisation may (eventually)
have on the erosion of state power. The government is central to economic and social
development, even if it has an enabling role, and if it (temporarily) forms partnerships
with civil society and the private sector. 
However, the extent of 'poor' or 'bad' local governance is quite dramatic indeed
in quite a few countries, and it is an enormous challenge, but an unavoidable task today
to stop bureaucratic decline and to escape the vicious circle of poor performance, de-
creasing salaries and morale, corruption, loss of public trust, worse performance etc.
Kabeer and Shah (1996: 48) make the following point in relation to the problems to in-
troduce gender aware planning:
'When policies which seek to redress culturally sanctioned inequalities have to
be implemented by individuals who themselves have been beneficiaries of
these inequalities, then implementors are critical stakeholders in the policy
process along with members of the community that will be affected'
They argue that gender aware planning must include an analysis of the various
institutional actors who are responsible for implementation, and the interest they have
in the success or failure of this type of planning. The same argument goes for the con-
straints to bring about good governance: the ones to be affected are the ones who are
now benefiting. A similar point is made by Hirschman (1999: 295) in relation to priva-
tisation as part of the structural adjustment programmes: 'the bureaucracy was being
asked to co-operate in diminishing or dismantling its own power'. Or, to put it again
differently, those governments most in need for change, are in the worst position and
have the least capacity to effect it.  
It may be clear then that, in order to move towards better local government, out33
side pressure is needed, particularly, as has been argued, from civil society, but also
from central government and donor agencies. It may be assumed that donors can and
should most effectively influence the National Government rather than directly (the
many) local governments. In turn, national governments should generally play an ena-
bling role to make it possible for local government to introduce and sustain participa-
tory governance.
 - guaranteeing civil liberties and human rights, and make available adequate budgets
for education; 
- introducing or fully implementing decentralisation, i.e. devolution of powers and
funds to local government, including taking measures to enhance local capacity;
- creating (or adjusting) a proper institutional framework in which local governments
operate in terms of legislation (which is enforced) clear rules and regulations;
- attaching conditions and setting clear criteria for making available central funds. 
For donors which are serious in their efforts to promote better or good govern-
ance at the local level, the following suggestions may be relevant. It may be understood
that they are valid in general, but that they would gain in effectiveness if implemented
in the context of or linked to the programmes of other donors in a city, a district, a sec-
tor.
- In view of the often poor capacity and chronic financial problems of many local gov-
ernments, the most appropriate role of local government is an enabling, facilitating
one. Key tasks then become designing and enforcing appropriate rules and regula-
tions, and to properly 'orchestrate' private sector and civil society involvement in so-
cial, economic, and policy implementation activity. A key issue is also enhancing
(or regaining) the public trust and legitimacy in its functioning (cf. Moore, 2000). 
- Participatory institutional assessments should be implemented by donors prior to do-
nor assistance to identify the nature, the strengths and weaknesses of existing local
institutions, including NGOs and GROs and to map the institutional context. 
- As was indicated when dealing with the poor and their organisations, local govern-
ment should actively involve local organisations in administration through partner-
ships and broad based participation. Local organisations are defined very broadly
here: existing political organisations but also informal, indigenous organisations,
women networks etc. (cf. the case of Bolivia). Much attention is then needed for
communication, which allows for understanding, access and influence even from
semiliterate or illiterate and isolated groups, perhaps building on or using indigenous34
channels of information (Dia, 1996: 16, Braden, 1999). It should capitalise on the
energy and dynamics, and promote a role of civil society, including NGOs.
- There is then certainly a need for donor agencies to support institutional development
(ID) for local government. However, it was indicated before that many such ID
projects had been far from successful (cf. Moore, 1995, de Wit, 1999), and these
should then be subject to conditions. For one thing, there should be clarity about the
objective of ID, and here the definition of Davies (1997: 615) might be useful as a
model. He argues in the case of NGOs that the definition of institutional develop-
ment should be biased in its orientation to the poorest: 'Institutional Development
should be seen as an improvement in an organisation's responsiveness to the needs
of its intended beneficiaries…(..).. In practice this could be seen in the form of: i)
finer discrimination between the beneficiaries' needs; ii) quicker responses to these
needs, and the ability to do (i) and (ii) on a larger demographic scale'.   
This definition cannot of course apply as such to local government but perhaps to
some local, poverty related and service delivery agencies. Clearly defining the ID
objective has the advantage that monitoring and evaluating progress is made easier. 
- Institutional development should be demand driven, following institutional assess-
ments. It is unavoidable to employ foreign experts, but TA should be used sparingly,
with the best possible staff, which is well aware of local conditions and sensitivities
(Teskey, 1996, de Wit, 1998).
- Institutional development or capacity building has often been equated with training,
which appears to be the least threatening and politically sensitive method. However,
it is potentially much more effective to pay attention to organisational development
(salary structures, incentive systems, merit based appointment and promotion, com-
bating corruption) and to effecting changes in the wider institutional context (laws,
enforcing property rights, curbing political interference). More effect can be ex-
pected if organisational development is done in a participatory way, by involving
staff and clients in the design of performance measures and incentive schemes (Klit-
gaard, 1997: 499). And if staff of one local government is trained, it makes sense not
to train only one or two staff members, but to train a whole group. This enhances the
chance that the information and experiences gathered will actually be implemented;
- A specific field is combating corruption. Corruption is of course not an issue to be
dealt with or to be solved in isolation. The term conceals and incorporates very
complex patterns of behaviour and relationships in countries, linked to often quite35
accepted norms, values and ideologies governing the distribution of resources and
rewards, modes of reciprocity and payment, patronage relationships, and status. It is
already quite positive that the issue attracts much attention, and it is important now
to sustain this attention in all donor programmes and policies, for example as part of
an institutional assessment before agreeing on a sectoral programme. The first task
is to assess its nature, than its impact, and finally to devise strategies to address the
most serious ('system undermining') forms (Klitgaard, 1996, 1997);
- Rather than focus training only on officials, it may be very effective to train also local
village or slum leaders,  Municipal Councillors, local and state level politicians and
ministers related to local governance and administration. Training should not be the
middle of the road upgrading of skills, but rather (also) have elements of discussing
sensitive and controversial issues like corruption and political interference, so as to
allow participants to reflect on their own functioning, the impact they make and pos-
sible changes. 
- Systematic client consultation relating to specific sectors could be held regularly at
the local level, either organised by the local Government itself or by independent
consultants or civil society groupings. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
Bringing about good governance is probably the most daunting and complex
challenge donor agencies have ever faced. Rather than the relatively simple business of
formulating, implementing and evaluating projects, they are moving away from this
level of policy towards much more complex and intangible institutional and governance
issues. It is only a thin line separating good governance policy instruments from politi-
cal conditionality, as is brought out by the policies of the Netherlands Government. In
general, there is a rather large gap between the large ambitions of the good governance
Agenda and the vision and means to implement it.
If donors are to be serious about effecting good governance, they have to start
paying much more attention to the local rural and urban level, where the people are
who suffer from 'poor' or even 'bad' governance. This paper has argued that it will not
be enough for donors to spend more funds on capacity building aimed at local govern-
ment - even though this should continue, while incorporating lessons learnt. For one
thing, in spite of huge spending, these efforts have so far not been sufficient anywhere,
and for another, sooner or later donors do leave and institutions may revert back into36
their old ways. After all, even though the ideal is to also change organisations, and the
institutional framework in terms of laws and regulations, this is rarely possible or ade-
quate, so that reforms are never complete. 
It seems much more promising to build up pressure on local government from
below, to explore ways to capitalise on the energy and resources of the poor, their or-
ganisations and civil society in general. Already now, local government is assumed to,
advised to and often more or less compelled to play an enabling role: facilitate the ef-
forts of the private sector, the informal sector and civil society to make the best of it.
This paper supports the idea that - especially where poverty reduction is concerned -
such efforts should be institutionalised, so as to include a mutually beneficial co-
operation between local government, the organisations of the poor and NGOs, which
has been termed participatory governance. Obviously, it would be nice and easy if local
government agreed and embraced this type of governance. The ideal outcome are
things like participatory budgeting, or formerly excluded indigenous groups suddenly
taking decisions over roads and schools in their isolated region. 
This, of course, is too easy in almost all cases. Even though it may be the best
way forward, the key condition of political will may not be met, which immediately
brings home the political nature of the good governance agenda. Local government of-
ficials and local politicians will generally be reluctant to part with power, or see many
real or imagined problems. And it is here where pressure from below, almost always
initiated and/or organised by active and dynamic change agents can make the differ-
ence. This is of course especially so if it coincides with pressure from the top from the
part of a central government and/or donors, which would enhance the possibility for a
gradual change towards increased local co-operation and participation.
However, the potential for powerful social movements to change government
action and to bring about social change should also be recognised, as indicated by mass
movement organised against corruption in Rajasthan, and the success of some such
movements particularly in Latin America. In some contexts, they could be an alterna-
tive to the complex, time consuming and risky efforts to build up participatory govern-
ance through partnerships of stakeholders with different views and interests. More re-
search on the relative advantages and sustainability of strategies in different countries
and contexts is needed. This certainly also applies to other, complex issues dealt with in
this paper often only briefly. 
Processes to build up pressure from below, and to partake in participatory proc37
esses are facilitated when poor men and women are literate and when they have some
degree of power and assertiveness. It would help if they could engage in processes of
organisation and mobilisation, including remodelling their informal or 'traditional'
grassroots organisations or to link them within larger federations. Therefore,
empowerment, however achieved, is important and this is where Southern NGOs can
play a critical role. This should be recognised by donor agencies and countries funding
Southern NGOs. These should work together much closer, and, from this position of
strength and influence, link up and negotiate with governments with a view to forge
tripartite partnerships, including the organisations of the poor. 
The efforts aimed at enhancing good governance are so demanding that they
need collective efforts where possible. The need for donor co-ordination has never been
more urgent, and this could and should now materialise in the context of sectoral ap-
proaches, in the same district, in the same city, in the same country. It may be assumed
that the magnitude of united policy advice and subtle pressure should have some im-
pact. Moreover, donor agencies should co-operate much more closely with Northern
and Southern NGOs, perhaps initially in selected cases to build up experience, to be
gradually expanded. The issues of poverty, inequality and sustainability are urgent
enough to warrant this type of united action, which would be a token of good Global
Governance on the part of the donor agencies. The poor in the south and the tax payers
in the North can rightfully accuse them of poor governance if they fail. 
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